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ABSTRACT
Theory predicts that in markets with increasing returns, the number of differentiated products
– and resulting consumer satisfaction – grow in market size.  We document this  phenomenon across
246 US radio markets.  By a mechanism that we term “preference externalities,” an increase in the
size of the market brings forth additional products valued by others with similar tastes.  But who
benefits whom?  We examine the patterns of – and mechanisms for – preference externalities between
black and white and between Hispanic and non-Hispanic radio listeners, and among listeners of
different age groups.  The patterns are striking: while preference externalities are large and positive
within groups, they are small and possibly negative across groups.  For example, while black-targeted
station entry and the black listening share increase in black population, they are unaffected (or
possibly reduced) by the size of the white population.  Consequently, small groups receive less variety
from the market.  Forces that increase the size of the market, such as emerging satellite and Internet








When fixed costs are large and preferences are heterogeneous, the number of
products available - and resultant consumer welfare - will increase with the size of the
market. The more potential consumers a product has, the more likely it will be brought to
market.  Larger markets will have more - and more varied - products, conferring greater
utility on consumers.  Through a mechanism that we term “preference externalities,”
consumers' utility will depend on the number of other consumers in the same market, but
only to the extent that they share similar preferences.  If I want Afghan food in Fargo,
North Dakota, will it be available?  Because restaurants have some fixed costs, it will need
some minimum threshold of customers to be viable.  I will find my Afghan restaurant only
if enough other people in Fargo also want Afghan food to bring forth an Afghan
restaurant.
A concrete example helps to introduce the question of who benefits whom.  Does
the satisfaction of blacks, as consumers, increase with the number of whites in the market,
or does it depend only on the number of blacks in the market?  If black and white
consumers have identical preferences, they will confer positive preference externalities on
each other.  Additional blacks with bring forth products value by both blacks and whites,
and vice versa.  On the other hand, if black and white consumers have “orthogonal”
preferences, they will confer no benefit on each other.
1  That is, preference externalities
will be zero.  But preference externalities need not be bounded at zero: additional
consumers can actually reduce the welfare of other types of consumers, in an effect
analogous to the tyranny of the majority.
                                                       
1 We illustrate “orthogonal” preferences at section I.2 below.2
Social scientists have long been concerned about the possible tyranny of the
majority in political contexts (see, for example, Mill, 1859).  The usual view among
economists is that markets avoid this sort of problem by giving each consumer what she
wants.
2  Embodied in the traditional view is the idea that production takes place subject to
constant returns to scale, so that the size of the market is irrelevant to whether products
are offered. While appealing, this argument is not always correct.  In the presence of fixed
costs, production cannot take place at arbitrarily small scale, so persons wanting
unpopular items can go begging.  A particular item is offered in a market only if it attracts
a critical mass of consumers.  This is part of what Spence (1976) terms the problem of
“product selection.”   What is offered is what can attract a large base of customers.
Yet, an analogue of tyranny of the majority can arise in the market as well.  A
consumer’s welfare depends on whether her favorite product is provided which, in turn,
depends on whether her favorite product’s other customers continue to purchase it.  When
another firm introduces an imperfect substitute for her favorite product, she can be made
worse off.  Suppose that some fellow consumers of her favorite product prefer the new
product, but she does not.  Suppose further than enough of her fellow customers are
diverted from her favorite product to the new product so that her favorite no longer
attracts enough customers to cover its costs.  Her favorite product is withdrawn.  This
negative preference externality mechanism operates like a tyranny of the majority in
                                                       
2 According to Friedman (1962), While the use of political channels “tends to strain the social cohesion
essential for a stable society,” the “widespread use of the market reduces the strain on the social fabric by
rendering conformity unnecessary.”  (pp. 23-4)3
markets.  It should be emphasized, however, that the “tyrannizing” group need not be the
numeric majority.
3
These considerations raise a series of empirical questions.  First, do preference
externalities exist?  That is, can we find evidence that consumer satisfaction increases in
the size of the market, as is implicitly suggested by existing theory?  Second, who benefits
whom?  That is, do all consumers generate the same preference externalities for each
other?  Third, is there evidence of negative preference externalities (“tyranny”) in markets?
Do some types of consumers reduce the number of options, or the level of satisfaction,
available to other consumers?
While preference externalities can operate in the market for any differentiated
product produced with fixed costs, the empirical portion of this paper focuses on a
particular media market, radio broadcasting.  Radio shares many features of other
information markets (see Shapiro and Varian, 1998), making it an interesting case study of
preference externalities, for at least five reasons.  First, as with other information markets,
fixed costs are important in radio.
4  Indeed, the costs of operating radio stations are
invariant with the number of users, as is true for developing computer software and many
other kinds of information generation.  Second, market size is limited technologically by
the distance that broadcast signals travel.
5  Third, market size is further limited by the
desire of local listeners for location-specific information (news, weather), which constrains
                                                       
3 As we detail below, an increase in the black population from low levels will bring forth black-targeted
products.  This, in turn, can allow formerly “stranded” black consumers to defect from white-targeted
products, possibly undermining their viability.  Despite on its face being a tyranny of the minority, this is
no less an example of the phenomenon that concerns us here.
4 Of course, the quality of programming determines both the cost and the number of users who will be
attracted.  In that sense, from which we abstract, fixed costs are endogenous.  See Sutton (1991).4
the willingness of listeners in one city to listen to broadcasts from another city.  Fourth,
there are a priori reasons to think that preferences for radio differ substantially across
groups (e.g., by age and race). This renders interesting an examination of the extent to
which preference externalities are confined to a single group or spill over across groups.
A final important justification for using radio as a case study is that the relevant data
(consumption by product type by consumer group by geographic market) are available.
We document a large and statistically significant overall preference externality: the
average fraction of the population listening to radio increases by 2 percent with a one
million person increase in population.  We then ask who benefits whom, by race
(black/white), Hispanic/non-Hispanic status, and by age.  We find sharply different
programming preferences between blacks and whites, between Hispanics and non-
Hispanics, and between older and younger listeners.  We find that the number of stations
targeted at each group depends strongly and positively on the size of the group and
substantially less – or negatively – on the size of the remaining population.  We argue that
this is evidence of a negative preference externality, or a tyranny of the majority, in the
market.  The share of each group listening – and, we infer, their satisfaction as radio
listeners – is shown to be sensitive to the number of stations targeting the group.
Connecting these links, we determine who benefits whom: each group's satisfaction as
listeners grows in the size of the group's own local population and is unaffected by, and
may even decline with, the size of remaining  population.  Not only do the product variety
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 New technologies, including both satellite (see www.cdradio.com) and Internet (see, for example,
www.spinner.com), can substantially increase the size of the market.  We return to this topic in the
conclusion.5
benefits of larger markets not spill across race, Hispanic status, or wide gulfs of age,
groups may limit each others’ product options.
While media markets are unusual, they are far from unique.  Many other markets
have features - large fixed costs and preferences differing sharply across consumers -
which could give rise to preference externalities that do not spill across groups.  Possible
examples, in addition to many sorts of information goods, include pharmaceuticals.  Some
illnesses affect too few persons to make profitable the development of treatments.
Markets can be small either because a disease is rare in the population generally or
prevalent only in small sub-populations (such as Tay-Sachs, which affects only Ashkenazy
Jews and French Canadians).  Preference externalities of the sort we discuss may arise in
other local services markets, such as restaurants and retailing.
6
The paper proceeds in five steps.  Section 1 connects arguments in the paper with
existing literature and sketches a simple theoretical framework.  Section 2 describes the
data used in the study.  Section 3 presents the basic evidence on preference externalities in
radio broadcasting.  Section 4 examines who benefits – or hurts – whom, by race,
Hispanic status, and age and documents the mechanism for the operation of preference
externalities (market size determines entry, which determines consumption).  Section 5
concludes with a discussion of the results’ implications.
This paper is about the effects of sizes of various groups on the welfare of each of
the groups, in their capacity as radio listeners.  Hence, this paper is about the distribution
of welfare.  However, this is not a normative paper.  We make no attempt to determine
whether the beneficial effects of, say, black listeners on other black listeners outweigh6
their possible negative effects on white listeners.  Instead, we simply pursue the more
tractable – and still interesting – goal of documenting who affects whom.  A companion




The theoretical background for this study is contained in Spence (1976a,b) and
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who present characterizations of imperfect competition.  In
Spence's model, firms have fixed costs and produce imperfect substitutes for each others'
products, and whether a product gets provided depends on whether the firm can cover the
product's fixed and marginal costs.  This, in turn, depends on the extents to which (a) the
firm can price discriminate, and (b) near-substitutes divert business.  In a world such as
Spence's, the number and mix of products produced will depend on the number and mix of
consumers.  This provides the motivation for our empirical questions: how does the
number and mix of persons in a market affect the number and mix of products, as well as
the extent to which different sorts of persons find satisfaction as consumers?
While a good deal of existing research examines questions related to those in this
study, although none (to the author's knowledge) looks at precisely these questions.  A
large group of studies examines effects of city size (or agglomeration) on productivity.
Ciccone and Hall (1996) provides a recent example with citations to earlier literature.  A
related strand of literature looks at the interactions of increasing returns and transport
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 The scope for the size and mix of the local market to affect consumer satisfaction is mitigated for some7
costs for regional patterns of production, trade, and development.
7   I am aware of few
studies that examine the consumption side.  One exception is Holmes (1998), which uses
the cross-MSA relationship between population (as a measure of market size) and the size
of the local food wholesaling sector to infer the importance of increasing returns to scale
in production and love of variety on the part of consumers.
More closely related to the present are studies of entry, such as Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990, 1991), which model the relationship between market size and the number of
entrants in a number of industries.  Models of the number of firms entering, these studies
provide no information about effects of market size on product variety and consumer
satisfaction.  Berry and Waldfogel (in press) present a model of entry in radio
broadcasting, along with evidence on the effect of the number of stations on the tendency
to listen.  Their results, that larger markets have more stations, and that more stations
attract a larger fraction of the population to radio listening, presage our basic evidence of
preference externalities, in section 3.
A final related literature consists of normative analyses of commercial broadcasting
in general (see, for example, Spence and Owen, 1977; Borenstein, 1988; and Anderson
and Coate, 1999, among others) as well as studies of minority broadcasting in particular
(Spitzer, 1991; Wildman and Karamanis, 1997; Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999).  Because
this is a positive study, our focus is quite different.
2. Simple Example
                                                                                                                                                                    
sorts of retailing by catalogs and Internet commerce.
7 See Krugman (1980, 1991) and Ellison and Glaeser (1997) for examples.8
A very simple example illustrates that, with fixed costs and differentiated products,
additional consumers may help, hurt, or have no effect on the satisfaction available to
other consumers.  To put this another way, preference externalities can be positive, zero,
or even negative.  This example is closely related to Beebe (1977) and Steiner (1952).
There are two products, apples and oranges, and three types of consumers:
1)  apple stalwarts - those who will only purchase apples (preference ordering: apples > >
nothing > bananas);
2)  prefer bananas – with preference ordering: bananas > apples > nothing; and
3)  banana stalwarts – with preference ordering: bananas  > nothing > apples.
We will refer to these types as 1-3.  Unless otherwise noted, assume that a product must
attract 10 consumers to be viable (to cover its fixed costs).
Case 1: Preference Homogeneity and Positive Preference Externalities
Suppose that all consumers are apple stalwarts.  Then adding consumers makes
everyone (at least weakly) better off.  In particular, the arrival of the 10
th consumer makes
the first apple firm viable, discretely increasing everyone’s options by making apples
available somewhere.  If consumers get benefits from additional apple firms beyond the
first, then the arrival of the 20
th and 30
th consumers, etc. also increase welfare.  Hence, in
the case of homogeneous preferences, preference externalities are positive and uniform:
everyone benefits everyone else, at least weakly.9
Case 2: Orthogonal Preferences and Zero Preference Externalities
Suppose there are only apple and banana stalwarts (types 1 and 3) and no banana
preferrers (type 2s).  Each of the two types that are present consumes only her preferred
option or nothing.  Let us examine entry into apple and banana provision as populations of
apple and banana stalwarts vary. In the table we describe entry as (number of apple firms,
number of banana firms).
Apple Stalwarts (type 1)
0 10 20
0 (0,0) (1,0) (2,0)




20 (0,2) (1,2) (2,2)
When there are no apple or banana stalwarts, there is no apple or banana firm entry.
When the number of apple stalwarts rises to 10, an apple firm enters, which we denote as
(1,0).  If 10 banana stalwarts arrive to accompany the 10 apple stalwarts in the market, a
banana firm enters, while the apple firm remains. The number of type 1 consumers (apple
stalwarts) affects only the number of apple firms, and the number of type 3 consumers
(banana stalwarts) affects only the number of banana firms.  In this example, preferences
are “orthogonal,” so that the markets for bananas and apples are distinct.  Preference
externalities are positive within type but zero across types.  Additional apple stalwarts
benefit other apple stalwarts.  Additional banana stalwarts benefit other banana stalwarts.
If consumers derive benefits from additional firms beyond the first offering their preferred10
product, then the arrivals of the 20
th and 30
th apple and banana stalwarts benefit other
apple and banana stalwarts, respectively.  The different groups have no effects on each
other, however.
Case 3: Negative Preference Externalities and the Tyranny of the Majority.
Now suppose there are 5 “flexible” persons of type 2, who prefer bananas to
apples but apples to nothing and so choose applies when bananas are not available but
bananas when they are.  It is easy to see that an increase in the number of consumers of
one type can reduce the number of options for another type.
Apple and Banana Entry with 5 Banana Preferrers (type 2)
Apple Stalwarts (type 1)
0 5 10
0 (0,0) (1,0) (1,0)




10 (0,1) (0,1) (1,1)
When the five type 2’s are accompanied by no persons of type 1 or 3, neither
product can attract enough customers to cover its costs.  With 5 apple stalwarts, 5 banana
preferrers (type 2), and no banana stalwarts, a banana firm could attract 5 customers,
leaving only 5 potential apple buyers.  Neither firm would be viable.  An uncontested apple
firm would attract all 10 customers, and no further entry would be viable.  Hence, the
market would get (1,0).  If the number of banana stalwarts increased to 5 (while the11
numbers of types 1 and 2 remain at 5), a banana firm would attract 10 customers, while
the apple firm would retain only 5.  The resultant pattern of entry would be one banana
firm and no apple firms (0,1).  Because of the existence of the flexible type 2 customers,
an increase in the number of banana stalwarts actually makes the apple stalwarts worse
off.  This is an example of a negative preference externality.
8
It is easy to see that reductions in fixed costs mitigate this negative preference
externality.  If only 1, rather than 10, customers are needed to make a firm viable, then if
there are 5 type 1’s, 5 type 2’s, and 5 type 3’s, there will be 10 banana firms and 5 apple
firms (rather than one and zero, respectively).  Both products have multiple outlets.
The distribution of persons across types has implications for the relationship
between the number of products and the fraction of persons consuming.  With only
stalwarts in the economy, additional products will attract persons from abstinence to
consumption, resulting in a strong positive relationship between the number of products
and the share of persons consuming.  The presence of consumers who prefer one product
but are willing to consume an alternative will weaken the positive relationship between the
number of varieties and the share of the population consuming.
The empirical goal in the remainder of the paper is to examine the operation of
preference externalities across race, Hispanic status, and age using US radio broadcast
markets as an example.   In particular, we seek to document how whether the share of
                                                       
8 The apple stalwarts are vulnerable in this example because the apple availability that they value is
dependent upon the banana preferrers, who are poised to defect from apples.  The logic of this example
suggests a reason, apart from naked rent-seeking by incumbent apple sellers, why some consumers’
welfare might be reduced by entry of, say, a “big-box” banana retailer on the outskirts of town.  While it is
by no means obvious that such entry would be on balance welfare reducing, it can have different
distributional impacts.  Here, it makes apple stalwarts worse off.  The example also suggests why apple
stalwarts might exhort fellow customers to support an apple firm, an activity one might label
“boosterism.”12
each group listening to radio, or the “listening share” (and, we infer, utility) increases with
the size of the market and the number of varieties.  We then turn to the question of “who
benefits – or harms – whom?”  Using data on listening behavior for groups of individuals
whose preferences may differ, we examine how the programming targeting each group,
and their listening, vary with the sizes of each of the groups.
II.  Data
The basic data set used in the study is a 1997 cross section of radio listening shares
and population, by group, for 246 large US radio markets.  The data also include the
number of stations, by programming format, along with a variety of city characteristics,
for each market.  The analysis in the paper is done at the market level, but the underlying
data are station-level.  The underlying data for all 246 markets include nearly 6000
stations.
The listening measure is Arbitron's average quarter hour (AQH) listening, the share
of the population listening to radio for at least five minutes during and average quarter
hour.  Arbitron (1997a) reports listening data by 13 age and gender groups in 167
markets.
9  Arbitron (1997b) reports listening data by black/non-black for 100 markets and
by Hispanic/non-Hispanic for 51 markets.  Data on stations' programming formats come
from Duncan (1997), which classifies stations into over 40 formats.
10
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 The 13 age and gender groups are teens (12-17) men 18-24, men 25-34, men 35-44, men 45-54, men
55-64, men 65+, women 18-24, women 25-34, women 35-44, women 45-54, women 55-64, women 65+.
10 A slightly aggregated list of Duncan's formats includes: Adult Contemp. (AC), AC/Contemp. Hit Radio,
Adult Contemp./New Rock, AC/Soft Adult Contemp., Album Oriented Rock (AOR), AOR/Adult
Contemp., AOR/Classic Rock, Album Oriented Rock/New Rock, Album Oriented Rock/Progressive,
Black, Black/Adult Contemp., Black/Gospel, Black/Oldies, Black/Talk, Big Band/Nostalgia, Big
Band/Nostalgia/Religious, Country, Country/Full Service, Contemporary Hit Radio (CHR), CHR/Adult13
We classify formats as “black-targeted,” “Hispanic-targeted,” “youth-targeted,” or
“older-targeted” using the following scheme:  We classify a format as black-targeted if
more than half of its listeners are black (Black, Black/Gospel, Black/Adult Contemp.,
Black/Oldies, Black/Talk, Gospel, Ethnic).  By the same criterion, we classify only the
Spanish-language (Spanish) format as Hispanic targeted.  Finally, because over 50 percent
of their listeners are 55 or older, we classify Big Band/Nostalgia, Full Service, Classical
and the various News and Talk formats as older-targeted.  No format has over half of its
listeners in the under 25 age group.  However, Top 40, Black/Top 40, Album Oriented
Rock, and Black format stations have 25 percent or more.  We classify these as youth-
targeted.
Table 1a presents information on the number of stations targeting each group,
listening data by group, and other city characteristics.  Across all 246 markets there are an
average of 24.5 commercial stations received in each market.
11  An average of 1.9
stations, or 7.8 percent, are black-targeted.  An average of 1.1 stations, or 4.4 percent of
stations are Hispanic-targeted.  Nearly a quarter of stations (22.7 percent, or 5.6 stations
per market) are youth-targeted.  Another 19.6 percent (4.8 stations per market) are older-
targeted.
Population averages 0.70 million persons across the 246 markets.  Average
population is larger in the samples of markets with black and Hispanic listening data.
Arbitron only reports minority listening separately in markets with substantial minority
                                                                                                                                                                    
Contemp., CHR/New Rock, Contemporary Hit Radio/Urban, Classical, Classic Album Oriented Rock,
Classic Hits, Ethnic, Easy Listening, Full Service/Variety, Full Service/Variety/Talk, Gospel, Jazz, News,
News/Talk, Oldies, Religious, Soft Adult Contemp., Spanish, Sports, Talk, Talk/Classic AOR, Talk/Full
Service, Talk/Jazz.14
populations, and these markets tend to be large.  Population averages 1.16 million in the
100 markets with black listening data; black population in the same markets averages 190
thousand, and the percent black averages 18.7 percent.  Population averages 1.62 million
in the 51 markets with Hispanic listening data; the Hispanic population averages 334
thousand, and the percent Hispanic averages 24.5 percent.  Because much radio listening
takes place in cars, we have data on the percent of population driving to work, which
averages about 40 percent.
Across all 246 markets, the simple average fraction of the population listening to
radio for at least five minutes during an average quarter hour (the “AQH listening share”)
is 15.8 percent.  Blacks listen more than whites (17.9 versus 15.4 in the 100 markets with
black data).  Hispanics listen more than non-Hispanics (17.5 versus 15.8 in the 51 markets
with Hispanic data).  That blacks listen more than whites, and Hispanics more than non-
Hispanics, despite facing far fewer stations targeting them indicates greater tastes for radio
listening among these communities.
Table 1b shows listening data by age and gender.  Listening increases with age,
from 11.2 percent for teens (12-17) to 17.9 percent for persons age 25-34, then declines
steadily 15.8 percent for persons 55-64 and some what more sharply to 14.2 for persons
over 65.  The age patterns are similar for men and women, although women under 65
listen less than men.
III.  Basic Evidence of Preference Externalities
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Non-commercial radio accounts for a negligible amount of total radio listening.  See Berry and
Waldfogel (1999a) for evidence about the relationship between commercial and public radio.15
The basic question is whether listener satisfaction, measured by the share of
population listening to radio, increases in the size of the market.
12  To test this we simply
regress the AQH listening share on population.  Results are in the first two columns of
table 2.  Column 1 includes no additional controls.  The remaining second column adds
including region dummies, the percent black, the percent Hispanic, and the fraction driving
to work.  The result of interest, that the listening share increases in population, does not
go away.  An additional million persons raises the listening share by 0.31 percentage
points (0.20 in the column 2 model with controls).
The remainder of table 2 explores the mechanism for the basic preference
externality result.  Columns 3 and 4 show that a higher fraction person listens to radio in
markets with more stations.  The AQH listening share is 0.07 percentage points higher in
markets with an additional station (0.05 in the column 4 model with controls).  Columns 5
and 6 show that a higher fraction of persons listens to radio in markets with more
programming formats.  The AQH listening share is 0.12 percentage points higher in
markets with an additional format (0.08 in the column 6 model with controls).  Because of
the possible endogeneity of stations and formats - more, and more varied, stations might
enter markets with greater unobserved tastes for listening - these results do not
demonstrate that product variety causes greater listening and satisfaction.
In table 3 we address this concern by statistically explaining the determinants of
products and variety.  Our explanation of preference externalities, that larger markets
bring forth more product variety, readily suggests population as an instrument for stations
and formats.  Columns 1 through 4 show how stations and formats vary with population,
                                                       
12 Of course, a listening share that increases with population is sufficient, but not necessary, to show that16
with and without controls.  With controls, an additional million persons in the market
brings forth 2.1 stations and 1.2 formats.  The last two columns of table 3 show how AQH
listening varies with stations and formats, including controls, using population as an
instrument for stations and formats.  The respective effects of stations and formats remain
significant and are roughly double their OLS counterparts in table 2.  This is a striking -
although not a surprising - result.  Consumers in larger markets face greater programming
variety, from which they derive greater satisfaction.  For radio listeners, preference
externalities across consumers as a whole are positive.
13
The estimated relationships between the listening share and the number of stations
or varieties, while significantly positive, have large intercepts and comparatively small
slopes.  While additional stations or formats draw some new listeners, much listening is
diverted from existing stations.  That the elimination of the marginal station or format
would reduce the listening share only slightly indicates that many listeners to marginal
stations would choose other stations, not radio abstinence, in the absence of their favorite
station.
IV.  Who Benefits Whom?
We have documented that listening - and therefore welfare associated with
consumption of radio programming - increases in market size.  This demonstrates that, in
their capacity as consumers, people confer a benefit on each other.  The next question,
                                                                                                                                                                    
satisfaction increases in population.
13 This evidence indicates that individuals’ quality of life – as radio listeners – is higher in larger markets.
This provides a consumption-based rationale for residential agglomeration into cities.  Benefits of
additional product variety must in general be balanced against the costs of congestion.  See Henderson
(1974).17
however, is whether all sorts of persons confer equal benefits on one another.  Whether
external benefits “spill” across groups depends on how sharply preferences vary across
groups.  Language differences make it easy to imagine why preferences in radio
programming might vary between Hispanics and non-Hispanics.  It is less obvious a priori
that radio programming preferences would vary by race or age, although journalistic
accounts of television viewing patterns indicate age and race-specific preferences.
14
We proceed in four steps to determine who benefits whom.  First, we examine how
preferences differ across groups.  Second, we examine how group-targeted entry varies
with the respective sizes of each of the groups.  Third, we ask whether listeners value
group-targeted programming.  The interested or impatient reader can skip to section IV.4
(and tables 11 and 12) to view direct evidence on the relationship between group listening
and sizes of various groups.
1.  Do Preferences Differ By Group?
Columns 2 and 3 of table 4 report 1997 distributions of black and white listening
by format.  It is obvious that blacks and non-blacks listen to very different programming.
Just over half of black listening is concentrated in only two formats, Black, and
Black/Adult Contemporary, which account for less than 2.5 percent of non-black listening.
As mentioned above, blacks make up the majority of listeners to stations in seven formats:
Black, Black/Adult Contemporary, Black/Gospel, Black/Oldies, Black/Talk, Gospel, and
Ethnic, which we term black-targeted.  Other formats attracting substantial amounts of
black listening include Contemporary Hit Radio/Urban and Jazz. Altogether, black-
                                                       
14 See Sterngold (1998, 1999) for discussions of television viewing preferences by race and age.18
targeted formats attract 61 percent of all black listeners, but only about 3 percent of white
listeners.
15
The Duncan index is commonly used to measure segregation—that is, the degree
to which the allocation of blacks and whites to neighborhoods or formats differs from
shares that are proportional to each group’s population share. The index gives the
proportion of all blacks and whites who would have to move (change format) in order to
achieve completely integrated listening.  For radio, the average 1997 black/white Duncan
index is 72.2, which is comparable to levels of black/white residential segregation.
16
The last two columns of Table 4 report 1997 listening data, by format and
Hispanic status, for markets with 1997 Hispanic listening data.  Like blacks, Hispanics
listen to different programming than non-Hispanics.  Hispanic listeners make up the
majority of listeners to the broad Spanish-language format, Spanish, which attracts 45.7
percent of Hispanic listening, and which we classify as Hispanic-targeted.  Other formats
with substantial numbers of Hispanic listeners include Contemporary Hit Radio (attracting
8.6 percent of Hispanic listeners) and Contemporary Hit Radio/Urban (6.3 percent).
Hispanic listeners are somewhat less segregated than blacks, with an average Duncan
index of 46.9.
                                                                                                                                                                    
15 The distributions of listening by race in table 3 actually understate the true differences in preferences
between blacks and whites because the reported distributions reflect all markets with black listening data,
including many with few black-targeted stations.
16Let sij be the share of all listeners of type i (i =b,w) listening to format j in a given market.  Then the
Duncan index for that market is D =100 *Sj |sbj - swj|/2. By comparison, the Duncan index for
residential segregation in the 15 Northern cities with the largest black populations in 1980 was 80.1
(Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 64).
Alternatively, let d = Min(sbj, swj)/Max(sbj, swj), where sbj is the percent of all black listeners
listening to format j and similarly for whites. There are only two formats, News and Soft Adult
Contemporary, for which d is greater than 0.5.19
Table 5 reports listening data, by format and age and gender.
17  These data reveal
substantial differences in preferences across age groups, both in formats, and number of
formats, chosen.  Teenaged (12-17) listening is heavily concentrated in three formats, top
40 (37.6 percent), Black (19.3 percent), and Album Oriented Rock (11.5 percent).
Teenagers listen to 4.8 format equivalents, fewer than any other age group.
18  The
popularity of these formats declines steadily with age (across cohorts).  Other formats are
increasingly popular among older listeners.  Listening of persons over 65 is heavily
concentrated in Big Band/Nostalgia (14.0 percent), Classical (3.6), Full Service (7.6),
News and News/Talk (16.3), and Talk (14.0).  The remaining formats, such as Oldies,
Country, and Classic Album Oriented Rock, have their peak popularity among middle
aged listeners.  Programming preferences differ little across listeners of similar ages but
differ sharply as the age gap widens.  The Duncan index grows in the distance between
age groups.  For example, the segregation index for 12-17s and 18-24s is 31.2, while the
index for 12-17s and over-65s is 75.7, close to its black-white level in the 1997 listening
data.
19  Thus, by this metric, black and white preferences in radio programming are as
similar as teenager and elderly preferences.
                                                       
17 The age and gender listening data are computed from Spring 1993 Arbitron station level data.  The
format classification is somewhat different than the 1997 classification because of the format proliferation
that followed the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  See Berry and Waldfogel (1999b).
18 Obviously, some listeners in all age groups choose each format.  Hence, we cannot simply count the
number of formats that any persons choose.  Our measure of the number of formats chosen is the format






f s  where 
2
f s is the square of the share of listeners (in an age group) choosing
format f and N is the number of formats.  When listeners are distributed symmetrically across formats, this
is simply N.   The concentration of teenage listening in few formats, in conjunction with their low
listening share, might reflect either the difficulty of reaching this audience (Sterngold, 1999) or possible
underprovision.
19 Because these data use a different format classification scheme than the 1997 data, the Duncan indices
are, again, not strictly comparable.20
With a few exceptions, male and female listening preferences are similar.  Album
Oriented Rock and Classic Album Oriented Rock are substantially more popular among
men than women (20.2 percent, together, vs. 9.4), while Soft Adult Contemporary is more
popular among women than men (10 percent vs. 6.4 percent).   Men and women are
considerably less segregated than blacks and whites, Hispanics and non-Hispanics, and
older and younger listeners.  The male-female Duncan index averages 19.6 across 169
markets in 1993.
Given these data on how listening preferences vary by group, we would expect
some localization of preference externalities.  In particular, we would not expect the
benefit of black population to spill over to whites as much as to other blacks, and vice
versa.  Nor would we expect benefits to spill substantially across the Hispanic divide.  By
age we would expect different effects: we expect positive spillovers to persons nearby in
age, declining as the age distance increases.  We would expect large spillovers by
gender.
20
The preference differences that we document are necessary but not sufficient for
the benefits of larger populations not to spill across groups.   For this mechanism to affect
satisfaction, we must further find evidence 1) that patterns of entry are affected (e.g. that
the relative populations of different groups affects the relative numbers of different types
of programming) and 2) that listeners from different groups value different types of
programming differently.  It is to these questions that we now turn.
2.  Group-Targeted Entry and Market Size: Do Markets Tyrannize Minorities?21
Given that listening preferences differ by race, Hispanic status, and age, we expect
entry of the various types of stations to depend on the relative sizes of the groups.
21  Table
6 reports regressions of the numbers of black and white-targeted stations on white and
black population, respectively, as well as region dummies and the percent driving to work.
As expected, group-targeted entry depends positively on own-group population but,
interestingly, negatively on the other group.  While an additional million whites adds 4.6
white-targeted stations, and additional million blacks reduces the number of white-
targeted stations by 12.8.  An additional million blacks raises the number of black stations
by 6.9 and an additional million whites reduces the number of black-targeted stations by
0.6.  This is evidence of negative preference externalities.
22
The remainder of table 6 does the same exercise for Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic
station entry.  We again find evidence of negative preference externalities.  As expected
Hispanic-targeted stations increase with the size of the Hispanic population, but we also
find that additional non-Hispanics reduce the number of Hispanic-targeted stations.
For both of the minority groups examined, the minority groups exert larger negative
effects on the number of white-targeted stations than whites exert on the number of
minority-targeted stations.  If these results are due to negative preference externalities,
then it must be the case that additional minorities in the market cause more defections
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Of course, there is virtually no independent variation in male and female population across markets, so
this proposition is untestable.
21 We recognize that we introduce endogeneity by classifying stations' targeting according to who listens.
However, we make our designation according to national listening to a format, rather than on station-level
listening.  The reader who remains concerned about endogeneity should note that we employ group
population as an instrument for group-targeted stations in regressions of group listening shares on group-
targeted stations (below at table 8).
22 We explored whether this result was due to spectrum scarcity rather than negative preference
externalities.  With a fixed number of possible stations, increases in the number of whites might decrease22
from white programming than additional whites induce defection from minority
programming.  Furthermore, the effect must be stronger for blacks than for Hispanics.
Many markets have few minorities and few minority-targeted stations (or none at
all).  In markets with few or no minority-targeted stations, minorities listen to other
(white-targeted) programming.  From small levels, increases in minority populations bring
forth the first few minority-targeted stations, allowing substantial “defection” of minorities
from white-targeted stations.
Table 7 depicts these phenomena.   In markets without black-targeted stations,
17.3 percent of blacks listen to the radio for five minutes during an average quarter hour,
as opposed to 18.3 percent in markets with four or more black-targeted stations.  By
construction, all black listeners in the markets without black-targeted stations listen to
white-targeted stations.  By contrast, only two thirds of black listeners choose white-
targeted stations in markets with one black-targeted station, and only a third of black
listeners choose white-targeted stations in markets with four or more black-targeted
stations.  The pattern of defection from white-targeted stations for Hispanics is similar
although less marked.  Three quarters of Hispanic listeners choose white-targeted stations
in markets with one Hispanic station, and half of Hispanic listeners choose white-targeted
stations in markets with four or more Hispanic-targeted options.
The substantial minority defection from white options as minority-targeted options
are available stands in contrast to the reverse phenomenon among whites.  No market is
without substantial white-targeted programming.  Across 246 markets, the minimum
number of white-targeted stations is 7.  Thus, there is no sample variation in white
                                                                                                                                                                    
the number of black-targeted stations.  The same regressions re-run but including only the 60 markets23
population that brings forth one of the first few available white stations.  Similarly, there
are no sample markets in which white listeners are “stranded” listening to black- or
Hispanic-targeted stations.  Hence, we expect little white “defection” from minority
stations and smaller negative preference externalities running from whites to minorities.
Table 8 asks how youth-, middle-age-, and elderly-targeted station entry varies
with the size of the respective age groups.  Results here are more equivocal.  The high
correlations of different age groups' populations across markets makes it quite difficult to
measure distinct effects of age group populations on group-targeted entry (or other
variables, as we see below).  For example, the correlation of over-55 and under-25
populations is 0.97, and other correlations among the three aggregative age groups are
higher.  Making inference even more difficult, preferences differ only slightly between
persons of adjacent age groups.  The only clear result in table 8 is that the size of the over-
55 population has a strong positive effect on over-55-targeted entry.  An additional million
persons over 55 adds 7.3 stations targeting them.
3.  Do Listeners Value Group-Targeted Programming?
We have documented that preferences differ across groups (particularly by race
and Hispanic status) and that entry is responsive to the distributions of persons by type.
We now turn to the question of whether listener satisfaction is affected by the pattern of
programming available by asking whether group-targeted stations attract listeners from
non-listening. If additional group-targeted programming reduces the group's share of non-
listeners, the new listeners reveal that they prefer the programming to whatever outside
                                                                                                                                                                    
with under 750,000 persons show the same substantive results.24
option they forego by turning on the radio.  Moreover, the stronger the relationships, the
greater the apparent fraction of stalwart listeners.
Table 9 reports results of regressions of black and white AQH listening
percentages on the numbers of white-targeted and black-targeted radio stations for 1997.
The black listening share increases in the number of black-targeted stations and is nearly
invariant with the number of white-targeted stations.  The results for Hispanics are similar,
although the smaller sample sizes makes them less precise.  Each group's listening depends
strongly on the stations targeted at it, and to a lesser extent—or not at all—on those
targeted at other groups.
The OLS results are likely to suffer from the endogeneity problem that entry will
tend to occur in markets where there is a high (but unobservable) tendency to listen.  This
would bias the coefficients in the top panel of table 9.  To correct for this problem, we
require instrumental variables that determine entry of black, Hispanic, and white-targeted
stations without directly affecting AQH listening. Measures of market size, such as
population, are natural candidates. We explore these instruments next.
In the bottom panel of table 9 we revisit the relationship between station entry (by
target group) and group AQH listening share, using IV estimates with group populations
as instruments (see table 6).  The IV results reinforce the OLS results: each group's
listening depends only on the number of stations targeted at it; the number of stations
targeted at the other group has no effect on its listening. These results provide strong
evidence that groups value programming that targets them, and are far less sensitive to
non-targeted programming.
23
                                                       
23 Note that listeners could still value variety even if we observed no effect of the number of stations25
The relative sizes of the own group coefficients are noteworthy.  In both the OLS
and IV specifications, additional black or Hispanic-targeted stations attract larger fractions
of their respective communities than an additional white-targeted station attracts whites.
The effect is particularly large for blacks.  This indicates that, relative to programming
options existing at the margin, minority populations contain higher fractions of stalwarts
drawn to radio by marginal minority-targeted stations but who would otherwise not listen.
The existence of stalwart minority listeners provides additional plausibility for the
proposition that blacks crowd out white-targeted stations.
Table 10 examines the relationship between different age groups' listening and the
number of stations targeting various age groups.  Results here (as with the relationship
between listening shares and population) are equivocal.  However, older listening
increases sharply with the number of older-targeted stations.  Given the limited success
using age-group population to explain age-targeted entry, we do not perform IV estimates
by age group.
4.  Who Benefits Whom: Direct Evidence
We have now assembled the pieces allowing us to determine who benefits whom.
Preferences differ across groups, sharply between blacks and whites and between
Hispanics and non-Hispanics and increasingly in distance between age groups.  Entry of
group-targeted programming depends positively on the size of the own group and, for
blacks and Hispanics, negatively on the size of the remaining population.  Finally, listeners
                                                                                                                                                                    
on listening. Even if total listening is invariant with station entry, listeners are at least weakly better
off with entry, as they get weakly more preferred choices.26
value group-targeted programming substantially more than they value other programming.
This all implies that radio listeners’ satisfaction grows in own-group population and is
either invariant or declines in the size of the remaining population.  Here we examine this
set of relationships directly.   Table 11 reports regressions of the shares of whites and
blacks listening to the radio on the numbers of whites and blacks, respectively, in the
markets, as well as controls.  The results are striking, although by now not surprising: the
white listening share increases in the number of whites and is negatively – but
insignificantly – related to the number of blacks.  The black listening share grows in the
number of blacks and is invariant to the number of whites.  An additional million whites
raises the white listening share by about 0.40 percentage points and has no significant
effect on the black listening share.  An additional million blacks raises the black listening
share by roughly 3 percentage points with no effect on the white share.
24  The result in
columns 1 and 2 of table 11 indicates that preference externalities in radio broadcasting
operate and are positive within blacks and within whites but are indistinguishable from
zero between them.
Black population had a negative and significant effect on white stations (recall
table 6), and white stations have a positive and significant effect on the white listening
share (table 9).  So why only a weak negative effect of black population on the white
listening share?  By the logic we have discussed above, a larger black population may
reduce the number of white-targeted options.  However, because of the large number of
                                                       
24 The relative sizes of the black and white own coefficients are consistent with the relative sizes of the
populations.  The black population is roughly a fifth the size of the non-black population.  A marginal
black-targeted entrant must attract a black listening share roughly five times the white listening share
required of a white-targeted entrant.  Of course, the coefficients do not show the shares attracted by the27
white-targeted options, the white listening share does not decrease much (recall the
relatively flat relationship between the white listening share and the number of white-
targeted stations).
The latter half of table 11 examines how Hispanic and non-Hispanic listening
shares vary with Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations.  Although significance levels are
lower here (recall, we have only 51 markets with Hispanic listening data), results mirror
those for blacks and whites: preference externalities are positive within Hispanic and non-
Hispanic groups and zero between them.
Table 12 examines how each age group's listening varies across markets with the
number of persons in each age group (the three groups are under 25, 25-54, over 55).
Despite substantial multicollinearity, the results suggest that preference externalities
operate differently by age: the over-65 listening share increases significantly only in the
number of elderly.
V.  Conclusion: What the Results Mean
Above we have argued that in differentiated product markets with increasing
returns, depending on how preferences vary across groups, while all consumers benefit
from others of their own types, additional consumers may have positive, zero, or negative
effects on the products and satisfaction available to other consumers.  Further, we have
shown that these effects are important in local media markets.  Radio programming
preferences differ sharply between blacks and whites, between Hispanics and non-
Hispanics, and (to a lesser extent) across age groups.  Additional consumers bring forth
                                                                                                                                                                    
marginal entrant.  Rather, they show the marginal impact on the overall listening share.  Still, the logic is28
additional products, but in this market the products brought forth are valuable almost
exclusively to members of their own groups.  This is an interesting finding, among other
reasons, because it gives a non-discriminatory reason why markets will deliver fewer
products – and, one might infer, lower utility— to “preference minorities,” small groups of
individuals with atypical preferences.
Is this an important effect in the economy, or a curious feature of radio markets?
While only additional research can answer this question, we can speculate here about other
markets where such effects might also operate.  The fundamental conditions needed to
produce compartmentalized preference externalities are large fixed costs and preferences
that differ sharply across groups of consumers.  These conditions are likely to hold, to
greater or lesser extents, in a variety of media markets -  newspapers, magazines,
television, and movies.  For all of these media, there is at least anecdotal evidence that
preferences differ across demographic groups (see, for example, Sterngold (1998, 1999)
on how television viewing preferences differ by age and race).  We would expect offerings
targeted to groups with atypical preferences to be especially thin in small local markets,
where the number of persons in the preference minority might be small.  While some
national cable television networks target blacks (BET) and Hispanics (Univision), for
example, relatively few local television outlets do.
Outside of media markets, we would expect to see similar effects for other goods
involving large sunk investments, such as pharmaceuticals.  Some diseases (e.g. Tay-
Sachs, sickle cell anemia) affect only small population groups.  Persons afflicted with rare
                                                                                                                                                                    
relevant.29
diseases will face fewer treatment options, all else constant, than persons afflicted with
diseases affecting larger groups of potential sufferers.   Tastes in food differ by ethnicity.
A consumer with atypical tastes will face less product variety than one with
common tastes.  The solution to the consumer’s problem is to increase the size of the
market to harness preference externalities from a larger group of potential fellow
customers.  The simplest means of accomplishing this is trade.  Provided that shipping
costs are not too high, trade increases the size of the potential market so that the variety
that producers offer is not limited by local appetites.  Some goods, such as restaurant
meals, live performances, and radio signals (to name a few), have traditionally been non-
tradable.
Where trade is not feasible, migration has provided an alternative way of
internalizing preference externalities to the interested community.  Persons sharing an
interest in some non-tradable product produced with increasing returns will achieve higher
utility living in an area with others also preferring the product.  For example, orthodox
Jews, who require a minyan (ten Jewish men) for prayer and may only walk to synagogue
during the sabbath, will achieve higher satisfaction living within walking distance of one
another.  This is similar to the Tiebout (1956) mechanism, by which consumers choose
communities on the basis of the publicly provided good bundle.  One might imagine
analogous forces encouraging agglomeration of persons sharing similar preferences for
private goods.  Voting with consumers’ feet would simultaneously match consumers with
their choices of publicly and privately provided goods only if such preferences were
strongly correlated, for example if all vegetarians share the same preference for publicly30
provided goods.
25  However, it is easier to imagine this mechanism explaining an
individual’s choice of location within a metro area than his choice of metro areas.
Recent technological change expands the set of easily tradable commodities to
include all “content” that can be digitized.  Two emerging technologies, satellite radio and
Internet radio, hold the promise of increasing the size of the audio content market.  CD
Radio plans to broadcast 100 channels of programming over satellites which can be
received anywhere in the US.  A listener wanting “Rock en Español” (channel 34 on the
CD Radio list) in Fargo is not limited by the number of similarly inclined listeners in Fargo.
Instead, she can benefit from similarly inclined listeners throughout the country.
Technologies that increase the size of the market harness preference externalities to make
relatively unpopular products available.  These technologies hold the promise of increasing
the satisfaction of persons whose preferences do not match their neighbors.
Results in this study confirm a common feature of trade theory (see, for
example, Krugman, 1980), that it is beneficial to have a large home market, as whites do.
Although many blacks and Hispanics live in large US broadcast markets, the sharp
difference between their preferences and majority preferences prevents them from enjoying
the benefit of the  home market effect of the large majority populations surrounding them.
The market delivers fewer products – and less associated satisfaction –  to these groups
simply because they are small.  The phenomenon can arise even if radio firms are rational
and entirely non-discriminatory.  Indeed, it may well be optimal for small groups to face
fewer options; the value of additional variety to small atypical populations may fall short
                                                       
25 Black’s preferences in radio programming must not be perfectly correlated with their preferences for
city characteristics: although their satisfaction as listeners increases in the size of the local black31
of the additional cost.  Still, whether efficient or not, this is a positive feature of how
differentiated product markets operate when there are increasing returns and consumer
groups have sharply different preferences.  Friedman argues, for markets and against
politics, that markets give each consumer what she wants without the strain on social
cohesion required by collective choice processes.  This may be true in some contexts, but
in differentiated product markets with increasing returns – as in politics – a consumer gets
more of what she wants if there are more like her.  Markets may be more like politics than
Friedman suggests.
                                                                                                                                                                    
population, blacks remain spread throughout the US.  Indeed, this is clear evidence that the Tiebout
mechanism does not simultaneously solve all public good and fixed-cost private good problems32
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Formats 14.80 16.31 16.84
Stations
Total 24.48 26.65 29.33
Youth-Targeted 5.56 6.48 5.53
Middle-Age-Targeted 14.12 15.32 17.96
Older-Targeted 4.80 4.85 5.84
White-Targeted 22.55 22.62 27.96
Black (non-white)-Targeted 1.92 4.03 1.37
Hispanic-Targeted 1.07 0.78 4.65
Non-Hispanic Targeted 23.41 25.87 24.69
AQH Listening (%)






Total 0.70 1.16 1.62
White (Non-Black) 0.63 0.97
Black 0.08 0.19
Non-Hispanic 1.28
Hispanic 0.07 0.11 0.33
Fraction Black 0.08 0.19 0.05
Fraction Black 0.05 0.03 0.25
Northeast 0.21 0.16 0.12
North Central 0.23 0.17 0.02
South 0.39 0.63 0.33
West 0.18 0.04 0.53
Fraction Driving to Work 0.42 0.42 0.40
Number of Markets 246 100 5136
Table 1b: AQH Listening Share (Percent) by Age for 163 Markets
12 to 17 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 65 +
Total Persons 11.21 16.39 17.96 17.29 16.56 15.90 14.27
Women 16.33 17.04 16.48 16.14 15.61 14.44
Men 16.44 18.86 18.12 17.00 16.24 14.0137
Table 2: Market Size, Variety, and Listening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. Coef s.e.
Constant 15.557 0.081 12.446 0.678 14.118 0.212 11.981 0.671 13.942 0.261 12.097 0.688
Population (m) 0.306 0.053 0.216 0.052
Stations 0.068 0.008 0.049 0.009
Formats 0.124 0.017 0.081 0.018
Northeast 0.905 0.225 0.761 0.222 0.837 0.226
North Central 0.524 0.230 0.667 0.225 0.632 0.230
South -0.174 0.222 -0.049 0.219 -0.036 0.228
Percent Driving to Work 5.643 1.572 4.282 1.526 3.956 1.570
Percent Black 3.009 0.880 2.730 0.855 2.570 0.904
Percent Hispanic 4.001 0.652 3.468 0.652 3.879 0.654
R-squared .1197 .3059 .2170 .3417 .1788 .3122
Note: Regressions of AQH listening on population and measures of available programming variety.  All regressions include 246 observations.38
Table 3: Entry and Variety and Market Size
Number of Stations Number of Formats AQH Listening (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 22.552 0.533 13.266 4.553 13.767 0.258 6.766 2.192 11.089 0.824 11.220 0.816
Population (m) 2.736 0.349 2.114 0.347 1.476 0.169 1.193 0.167
Stations 0.102 0.026
Formats 0.181 0.046
Northeast 3.565 1.515 1.243 0.729 0.540 0.258 0.679 0.249
North Central -2.729 1.546 -1.221 0.744 0.803 0.250 0.745 0.249
South -4.234 1.492 -2.799 0.718 0.259 0.273 0.333 0.286
Percent Driving 20.000 10.565 15.876 5.086 3.597 1.669 2.766 1.739
Percent Black 17.095 5.914 12.810 2.847 1.260 1.129 0.688 1.236
Percent Hispanic 17.119 4.383 5.549 2.110 2.251 0.887 2.996 0.785
R-Squared .2017 .3397 .2381 .3787 .2390 .2232
Note: All regressions include 246 observations.  Columns 2 and 4 are first-stage regressions for columns 5 and 6, respectively.39
Table 4: Stations and Listening, by Race and Format, 1997
101 Markets with Black
Listening
54 Markets with Hisp. Listening
Percent of…
Stations Listening Stations Listening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Format Non-Black Black Non-Hisp. Hispanic
Adult Contemp. (AC) 5.9 6.7 2.0 5.0 5.4 3.4
AC/Contemp. Hit Radio 2.1 2.9 0.8 2.3 2.9 1.5
Adult Contemp./New Rock 0.6 1.1 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.6
AC/Soft Adult Contemp. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Album Oriented Rock (AOR) 5.3 6.0 0.7 4.5 4.9 2.4
AOR/Adult Contemp. 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
AOR/Classic Rock 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Album Oriented Rock/New Rock 3.0 3.7 0.5 3.1 3.3 1.9
Album Oriented Rock/Progressive 1.0 1.3 0.1 1.8 1.6 0.6
Black 7.5 1.7 32.5 1.6 4.0 1.6
Black/Adult Contemp. 3.2 0.8 18.3 1.4 4.6 1.7
Black/Gospel 1.2 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0
Black/Oldies 1.0 0.1 2.4 0.3 0.5 0.0
Black/Talk 0.2 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.0
Big Band/Nostalgia 4.7 4.2 0.5 4.2 4.1 1.2
Big Band/Nostalgia/Religious 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Country 13.0 11.9 1.5 10.6 8.7 4.0
Country/Full Service 0.1 0.2 0.0 5.2 6.0 8.6
Contemp. Hit Radio (CHR, top40) 5.6 6.7 2.5 0.4 0.8 0.4
CHR/Adult Contemp. 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
CHR/New Rock 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Contemporary Hit Radio/Urban 1.1 2.7 7.7 1.5 4.2 6.3
Classical 1.2 2.4 0.5 1.8 3.0 0.9
Classic Album Oriented Rock 3.3 4.0 0.5 4.1 3.8 2.3
Classic Hits 1.5 1.5 0.2 1.1 1.1 0.3
Ethnic 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
Easy Listening 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Full Service/Variety 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1
Full Service/Variety/Talk 1.2 2.4 0.8 0.6 1.7 0.2
Gospel 2.0 0.1 3.8 0.4 0.3 0.0
Jazz 2.0 2.3 6.5 3.0 4.2 2.0
News 1.4 3.0 2.9 1.9 4.6 1.1
News/Talk 2.5 3.2 1.0 3.3 3.4 1.1
Oldies 5.6 6.7 1.7 5.2 6.1 4.4
Religious 5.4 1.2 2.5 3.5 1.2 0.9
Soft Adult Contemp. 3.4 5.2 2.3 3.8 4.7 3.2
Spanish 2.9 7.4 0.2 16.1 0.5 45.7
Sports 2.9 2.1 1.0 3.0 2.7 1.0
Talk 6.0 6.1 1.7 7.0 8.0 2.2
Talk/Classic AOR 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0
Talk/Full Service 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Talk/Jazz 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Note:  black-targeted formats appear bold; older-targeted formats are underlined; and younger-targeted
formats appear in italics.40
Table 5: Listening Patterns by Age and Gender (1993)
Age gender
age 12-17 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ men women total
Adult Contemp 6.4% 9.4% 12.0% 12.4% 10.3% 5.7% 2.3% 7.0% 11.8% 22214
Album Oriented Rock 11.5% 21.5% 19.6% 10.2% 3.0% 0.7% 0.4% 14.7% 7.1% 26096
Big Band/Nostalgia 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.7% 2.2% 8.3% 14.0% 3.0% 3.7% 7603
Black 19.3% 12.2% 8.6% 6.7% 5.0% 3.1% 2.3% 5.9% 7.5% 18253
Black/Adult Contemp 0.3% 0.4% 0.8% 1.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.1% 0.6% 0.8% 1589
Black/Oldies 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 305
Black/Talk 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 578
Black/Top 40 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 649
Classic Album
Oriented Rock
2.1% 5.4% 6.7% 5.2% 1.4% 0.4% 0.3% 5.5% 2.3% 9002
Classical 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.2% 2.2% 3.6% 3.6% 1.7% 1.6% 3682
Country 9.2% 11.2% 12.4% 13.4% 18.2% 17.6% 11.2% 13.1% 14.1% 32078
Ethnic 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 497
Full Service 0.4% 0.5% 1.3% 2.6% 4.4% 7.6% 10.1% 3.8% 3.8% 8562
Gospel 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 0.4% 0.9% 1491
Hispanic 3.6% 5.3% 6.1% 5.5% 5.5% 5.2% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 12747
Jazz 0.3% 0.8% 1.9% 3.3% 2.2% 1.7% 0.8% 2.2% 1.7% 4351
News 0.2% 0.3% 0.9% 1.7% 2.6% 4.6% 6.2% 2.5% 2.3% 5349
News/Talk 0.4% 0.7% 2.0% 3.3% 5.3% 7.5% 10.1% 4.8% 3.7% 9609
Oldies 3.0% 2.6% 4.3% 9.8% 11.1% 4.3% 2.1% 6.2% 5.6% 13732
Religious 0.4% 0.5% 1.1% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 0.9% 1.7% 3022
Soft Adult Contemp 2.1% 4.1% 5.7% 7.6% 11.2% 13.2% 11.2% 6.4% 10.0% 18731
Talk 0.5% 1.1% 2.5% 3.9% 5.8% 8.7% 14.0% 5.8% 4.9% 12039
Top 40 37.6% 21.2% 10.7% 6.9% 3.9% 1.6% 0.9% 7.2% 8.9% 24390
Top 40/Adult
Contemp
0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.6% 1216
missing 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 2.1% 2.3% 1.2% 1.3% 2912
Total 16659 32343 56074 48811 32051 22652 32107 108896 115142
Format Equivalents 4.8 7.4 9.8 12.6 11.5 11.4 10.6 13.1 13.041







coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 20.504 4.024 -1.909 1.124 13.255 4.106 5.629 1.164
Population (millions)
  White (Non-Black) 4.639 0.792 -0.556 0.221
  Black -12.783 4.100 6.916 1.145
  Non-Hispanic 3.089 0.563 -0.620 0.160
  Hispanic -2.561 2.031 5.609 0.576
Northeast 2.714 1.390 0.047 0.388 3.863 1.400 -1.739 0.397
North Central -3.487 1.428 0.023 0.399 -2.430 1.422 -1.758 0.403
South -4.221 1.291 1.897 0.361 -1.913 1.223 -1.393 0.347
Percent Driving to Work 5.170 9.731 6.740 2.717 21.275 9.913 -7.908 2.810
N 246 246 246 246
R-sq 0.348 0.394 0.275 0.47042
Table 7: What Formats Do Listening Minorities Choose in the Absence of Minority-
Targeted Programming?  (1997 Listening Data)
Black Listening non-Black Listening
Number of Black-Targeted Stations
0 1 2 3 4+ 0 1 2 3 4+
Percent Listening to…
  Black-Targeted Formats 0.0 36.6 62.0 51.5 63.1 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.0 3.3
  Other Formats 100.0 63.4 38.0 48.5 36.9 100.0 99.1 98.3 98.0 96.7
AQH Listening Share 17.30 17.32 17.21 17.37 18.38 16.19 14.82 15.26 15.65 15.42
Number of Markets 2 8 13 21 57 2 8 13 21 57
Hispanic Listening Non-Hispanic Listening
Number of Hispanic-Targeted Stations
0 1 2 3 4+ 0 1 2 3 4+
Percent Listening to…
  Hispanic-Targeted Format 0.0 25.0 21.0 23.1 49.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.7
  Other Formats 100.0 75.0 79.1 76.9 51.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.3 99.3
AQH Listening Share 15.55 16.58 17.44 17.43 17.87 15.99 14.69 16.11 16.02 15.68
Number of Markets 4 4 10 6 30 4 4 10 6 30
Note: Black-targeted formats include Black, Black/AC, Black/Talk, Gospel, Ethnic, and Black/Oldies.  “Hispanic”
stations are classified as Hispanic-targeted.43







coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 2.040 1.863 15.219 3.607 5.207 1.744
Young Population 7.839 6.026 5.497 11.665 0.574 5.639
Middle-Aged Population -3.417 2.616 0.156 5.064 -2.533 2.448
Older Population 2.407 2.439 -0.292 4.721 7.299 2.282
Northeast 1.744 0.591 -2.147 1.144 0.289 0.553
North Central -0.412 0.601 -5.314 1.163 -1.283 0.562
South -0.035 0.499 -2.749 0.966 -2.368 0.467
Percent Driving 7.933 4.593 5.026 8.891 2.162 4.298
R-squared .1780 .2957 .3762
N 162 162 16244
Table 9: Do Listeners Value Group-Targeted Programming? (Race and Hispanic Status)
White Listening Black Listening Non-Hisp.
Listening
Hisp. Listening
OLS Estimates coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 10.687 1.214 13.686 2.337 13.908 1.533 14.376 2.759
White-Targeted Stations 0.111 0.019 0.051 0.036
Black-Targeted Stations 0.045 0.051 0.298 0.098
Non-Hisp.-Targeted Stations -0.006 0.024 -0.064 0.043
Hispanic-Targeted Stations 0.054 0.048 0.238 0.085
Northeast 1.167 0.576 1.352 1.108 2.039 0.548 1.787 1.002
North Central 1.256 0.608 -0.314 1.171 1.737 1.044 1.008 1.933
South 0.617 0.607 0.372 1.168 -0.236 0.372 0.048 0.659
Percent Driving 3.024 2.385 3.464 4.592 4.056 3.740 8.556 6.614
R-Squared .4754 .1874 .3339 .1799
N 100 100 51 52
White Listening Black Listening Non-Hisp.
Listening
Hisp. Listening
IV Estimates coef s.e. coef s.e. Coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 9.240 1.727 9.073 3.852 13.444 2.421 11.394 4.533
White-Targeted Stations 0.154 0.041 0.187 0.091
Black-Targeted Stations 0.119 0.133 0.784 0.297
Non-Hisp.-Targeted Stations 0.102 0.063 0.163 0.124
Hispanic-Targeted Stations -0.020 0.106 0.166 0.199
Northeast 1.284 0.630 1.520 1.405 0.809 0.951 -0.547 1.852
North Central 1.645 0.746 0.723 1.665 0.920 1.332 -0.662 2.607
South 1.132 0.877 1.556 1.956 0.657 0.645 1.764 1.196
Percent Driving 2.454 2.585 0.182 5.765 -0.985 5.998 2.008 10.824
R-squared .4294 .0234
N 100 100 51 52
Note: Instruments for the numbers of group-targeted stations include group populations.  See table 6 for first-stage regressions.45
Table 10: Do Listeners Value Age-Targeted Programming?
Young Middle Aged Older
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 10.730 1.000 15.212 0.891 10.890 1.270
Young-Targeted Stations -0.054 0.050 -0.062 0.044 -0.119 0.063
Middle-Aged-Targeted 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.107 0.032
Older-Targeted Stations 0.084 0.051 0.167 0.045 0.236 0.064
Northeast 0.485 0.304 0.975 0.271 2.058 0.387
North Central -0.306 0.311 0.754 0.277 1.788 0.396
South 0.316 0.295 0.568 0.263 0.057 0.375
Percent Driving 4.570 2.258 0.454 2.007 0.751 2.862
Percent Black 4.431 0.997 3.102 0.890 4.756 1.269
Percent Hispanic 3.950 0.835 2.597 0.745 2.342 1.062
N 162 163 163
R-squared .3497 .2892 .4595
Note: Youth-targeted formats include Top 40, Black/Top 40, Album Oriented Rock, and Black;
and older-targeted formats include Big Band/Nostalgia, Full Service, Classical, and various News
and Talk formats.   We classify as "young" listeners who are under 25.  "Older" listeners are over 55.46










coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 12.219 1.276 12.317 2.144 14.077 1.272 15.800 2.521
White Population 0.404 0.180 0.041 0.303
Black Population -0.593 0.880 2.723 1.478
Non-Hispanic Population 0.175 0.150 0.046 0.296
Hispanic Population 0.017 0.408 1.004 0.808
Northeast 1.491 0.721 1.299 1.212 1.249 0.595 0.074 1.179
North Central 1.020 0.735 -0.471 1.235 0.758 1.169 -0.267 2.317
South 0.168 0.718 0.670 1.206 -0.132 0.304 0.608 0.603
Percent Driving 5.774 2.681 10.612 4.505 3.478 3.150 2.784 6.243
N 100 100 51 51
R-squared .3690 .2552 .3794 .138647
Table 12: Who Benefits Whom, by Age?
Young  Listening Middle Aged
Listening
Older Listening
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Constant 10.464 1.032 14.862 0.935 11.378 1.379
Young Population 0.682 3.111 2.112 2.818 -6.345 4.156
Middle Aged Population -0.890 1.328 -2.514 1.203 1.478 1.774
Older Population 2.005 1.244 4.468 1.127 3.318 1.662
Northeast 0.292 0.307 0.682 0.278 1.729 0.410
North Central -0.579 0.310 0.280 0.281 1.124 0.414
South 0.119 0.292 0.053 0.264 -0.512 0.390
Percent Driving 6.627 2.456 3.908 2.224 5.337 3.280
Percent Black 3.902 0.984 2.806 0.892 3.767 1.315
Percent Hispanic 4.346 0.779 3.335 0.705 4.295 1.040
N 162 162 162
R-squared .3533 .2756 .4091